Abstract:The intellectual property protection system constructed by China’s Foreign Investment Law has opened a new phase of rule of law protection of intellectual property rights for foreign-invested enterprises, which is an important institutional support indispensable for optimizing the business environment under the rule of law.The introduction of the system is influenced by external pressure from the investor’s home country, the innovation-driven development strategy, and the trend towards a high level of stringent protection of international intellectual property and investment rules, among other internal and external factors.In addition, there is a latent game of interests between multiple subjects, which can be analyzed by constructing two standard formal game models according to legal game theory.The first game model aims to compare and analyze the gains and losses of China and India’s IPR protection system for foreign-invested enterprises to attract foreign investment, with the optimal solution being a moderate protection strategy for India and a strict protection strategy for China. The second game model is designed to analyze the benefits of China and foreign investors under their respective possible behaviors before and after the inclusion of IPR protection provisions in the Foreign Investment Law, with the optimal solution being a“moderately cautious”strategy for foreign investors and a “strict enforcement”strategy for China.